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Pairwise Kidney Exchange

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  • Alvin E. Roth
  • Tayfun Sonmez
  • M. Utku Unver

Abstract

In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, S”nmez, and šnver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival `robabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and dOnor (unless there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although thd pairwise constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms 4hat are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of meahanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accomodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms that allow considerations of distributive justice to be addressed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10698.

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Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Publication status: published as Roth, Alvin E., Tayfun Sonmez and M. Utku Unver. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Journal of Economic Theory 125(2): 151-188, December 2005
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10698

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  2. Anna Bogomolnaia & Herve Moulin, 2004. "Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(1), pages 257-279, 01.
  3. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2001. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 0112002, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2002.
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  6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eiichi Miyagawa & Licun Xue, 2002. "Random paths to stability in the roommate problem," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0102-65, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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  8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
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  10. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
  11. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
  12. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1997. "Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 284-329, April.
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  14. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
  16. Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," NBER Working Papers 6963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
  18. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  19. Hervé Moulin & Anna Bogomolnaia, 2002. "A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 623-636.
  20. Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
  21. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  22. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  23. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
  24. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 265-280, October.
  25. Roth, Alvin E., 1985. "The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 277-288, August.
  26. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
  27. Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Auction Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 779, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  28. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  29. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  30. Roth, Alvin E. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1977. "Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 131-137, August.
  31. Teo, Chung-Piaw & Sethuraman, Jay, 2000. "On a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and its applications," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 195-205, May.
  32. Robert Wilson, 2002. "Architecture of Power Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1299-1340, July.
  33. Stefanos A. Zenios, 2002. "Optimal Control of a Paired-Kidney Exchange Program," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 48(3), pages 328-342, March.
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