Centralized allocation in multiple markets
AbstractWe study the problem of centralized allocation of indivisible objects in multiple markets. We show that the set of allocation rules that are group strategy-proof andPareto-efficient are sequential dictatorships. Therefore, the solution of the joint al-location in multiple markets is significantly narrower than in the single-market case.Our result also applies to dynamic allocation problems. Finally, we provide conditionsunder which the solution of the single-market allocation coincides with the multiple-market case, and we apply this result to the study of the school choice problem withsibling priorities
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Date of creation: 16 Apr 2013
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- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
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