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House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence

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Author Info
Tayfun Sönmez (Koç University)
M. Utku Ünver (Koç University)

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze two house allocation mechanisms each of which is designed to eliminate inefficiencies in real-life house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers. The first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a "sister" exchange economy which is constructed by assigning each existing tenant her current house and randomly assigning each newcomer a vacant house. The second mechanism -top trading cycles mechanism- first chooses an ordering from a given distribution and next determines the final outcome as follows: Assign first agent her top choice, next agent her top choice among remaining houses and so on, until someone demands house of an existing tenant who is still in the line. At that point modify the queue by inserting her at the top and proceed. Similarly, insert any existing tenant who is not already served at the top of the queue once her house is demanded. Whenever a loop of existing tenants forms, assign each of them the house she demands and proceed. Our main result is that the core based mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the top trading cycles mechanism which orders newcomers before the existing tenants.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0112002.

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Date of creation: 15 Dec 2001
Date of revision: 26 Sep 2002
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0112002

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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  1. Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "When queueing is better than push and shove," Discussion Papers 144, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Klaus,Bettina, 2005. "The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible," Research Memoranda 018, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  4. Yan Chen & Tayfun Sonmez, 2002. "Improving Efficiency of On-Campus Housing: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1669-1686, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2006. "Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 640, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Mihai Manea, 2008. "Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 489-496, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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