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Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation

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  • Lars Ehlers
  • Bettina Klaus

Abstract

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 33.

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Date of creation: Mar 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:33

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Keywords: Indivisible objects; resource-monotonicity;

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References

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  1. Alkan, Ahmet & Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David, 1991. "Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1023-39, July.
  2. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
  3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  4. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2005-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1992. "An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1331-49, November.
  6. Szilvia Pápai, 2001. "Strategyproof single unit award rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 785-798.
  7. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  8. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  9. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
  10. Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
  11. Alkan, Ahmet, 1994. "Monotonicity and Envyfree Assignments," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 605-16, May.
  12. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina & Papai, Szilvia, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 329-339, November.
  13. Ehlers, Lars, 2002. "Coalitional Strategy-Proof House Allocation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 298-317, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2005. "Consistent House Allocation," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2005-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  2. Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina, 2006. "Efficient priority rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 372-384, May.
  3. EHLERS, Lars & KLAUS, Bettina, 2009. "Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2009-16, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  4. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip, 2013. "Local and global consistency properties for student placement," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 222-229.
  5. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn, 2007. "Fair and efficient student placement with couples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 177-207, October.

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