Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices

We propose a new set of mechanisms, which we call serial dictatorship mechanisms with individual reservation prices for the allocation of homogeneous indivisible objects, e.g., specialist clinic appointments. We show that a mechanism $$\varphi $$ φ satisfies minimal tradability, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, consistency, independence of unallocated objects, and non-wasteful tie-breaking if and only if there exists a reservation price vector r and a priority ordering $$\succ $$ ≻ such that $$\varphi $$ φ is a serial dictatorship mechanism with reservation prices based on r and $$\succ $$ ≻ . We obtain a second characterization by replacing individual rationality with non-imposition. In both our characterizations r, $$\succ $$ ≻ , and $$\varphi $$ φ are all found simultaneously and endogenously from the properties. Finally, we illustrate how our model, mechanism, and results capture the normative requirements governing the functioning of some real-life markets and the mechanisms that these markets use.