Centralized Allocation in Multiple Markets
AbstractThe problem of allocating indivisible objects to different agents, where each individual is assigned at most one object, has been widely studied. Pápai (2000) shows that the set of strategy-proof, nonbossy, Pareto optimal and reallocation-proof rules are hierarchical exchange rules | generalizations of Gale's Top Trading Cycles mechanism. We study the centralized allocation that takes place in multiple markets. For example, the assignment of multiple types of indivisible objects; or the assignment of objects in successive periods. We show that the set of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient and nonbossy rules are sequential dictatorships, a special case of Pápai's hierarchical exchange rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2012-09.
Date of creation: 10 May 2012
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/
Matching; Strategy-Proofness; Nonbossiness; Pareto efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2012-05-22 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2012-05-22 (Microeconomics)
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