A dynamic school choice model
AbstractThis paper considers a real-life assignment problem faced by the Mexican Ministry of Public Education. Inspired by this situation, we introduce a dynamic school choice problem that consists in assigning positions to overlapping generations of teachers. From one period to another, agents are allowed either to retain their current position or to choose a preferred one. In this framework, a solution concept that conciliates the fairness criteria with the individual rationality condition is introduced. It is then proved that a fair matching always exists and that it can be reached by a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley. We also show that the mechanism is dynamic strategy-proof, and respects improvements whenever the set of orders is lexicographic by tenure.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos in its series Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos with number 2011-05.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
school choice; overlapping agents; dynamic matching; deferred acceptance algorithm;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-06-11 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2011-06-11 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-URE-2011-06-11 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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