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Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design

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York YO10 5DD

Phone: (0)1904 323776
Web page: http://www.mechanism-design.org/
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Serial Information

Series handle: RePEc:jmi:articl
ISSN: 2399-8458

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Content

December 2023, Volume 8, Issue 1

1-55 Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications
by Zhan Wang & Jinpeng Ma & Hongwei Zhang
57-74 Golden rule in cooperative commons
by Sjur Didrik Flam
75-96 A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem
by Gian Caspari
97-106 Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players
by Pathikrit Basu
107-150 Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening
by Braulio Calagua

December 2022, Volume 7, Issue 1

1-43 Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications
by Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung
45-69 Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach
by Peter Csoka & P. Jean-Jacques Herings
71-111 Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes
by Dilek Sayedahmed
113-129 Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited
by Krzysztof R. Apt & Jan Heering
131-150 A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility
by Dimitris Voliotis

December 2021, Volume 6, Issue 1

1-36 Object-based unawareness: Axioms
by Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung
37-58 Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems
by Youngsub Chun
59-100 A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment
by Tobias Reischmann & Thilo Klein & Sven Giegerich
101-112 On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination
by Ram Orzach & Miron Stano
113-148 Dream teams and the Apollo effect
by Alex Gershkov & Paul Schweinzer

December 2020, Volume 5, Issue 1

1-35 Implementation with ex post hidden actions
by Caleb Koch
37-77 On optimal taxes and subsidies: A discrete saddle-point theorem with application to job matching under constraints
by Koji Yokote
79-97 On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions
by Simon Hoof
99-117 Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match
by Muhammad Maaz & Anastasios Papanastasiou
119-140 Rights and rents in local commons
by Sjur Didrik Flåm

November 2019, Volume 4, Issue 1

1-38 Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations
by Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely
39-86 A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China
by Jianxin Rong & Ning Sun & Dazhong Wang
87-108 Pareto Optimal Coalitions of Fixed Size
by Ágnes Cseh & Tamás Fleiner & Petra Harján
109-117 A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information
by Andrés Salamanca
119-137 Loss Aversion in Financial Markets
by Liyan Yang

December 2018, Volume 3, Issue 1

1-15 The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited
by Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi & Francesco Ciardiello
17-50 Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms
by André Schmelzer
51-96 Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences
by James Fisher
97-110 Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences
by Haris Aziz
111-132 A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem
by Jingang Zhao

December 2017, Volume 2, Issue 1

1-37 On a spontaneous decentralized market process
by Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang
39-55 Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions
by Ola Andersson & Tommy Andersson
57-104 Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design
by André Veski & Péter Biró & Kaire Põder & Triin Lauri
105-140 On the Partnership formation problem
by Akiyoshi Shioura
141-159 Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models
by Philip R Neary & Jonathan Newton

December 2016, Volume 1, Issue 1

1-44 Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
by Jinpeng Ma & Qiongling Li
45-82 School choice under complete information: An experimental study
by Yan Chen & Yingzhi Liang & Tayfun Sönmez
83-107 On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game
by Papatya Duman & Walter Trockel
109-149 An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders
by Gerard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang
151-273 Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory
by Kazuo Murota

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