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Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

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Author Info
Lars-Gunnar Svensson () (Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, SE-22007 of Lund, Sweden)
Abstract

Strategy-proof allocation of a finite number of indivisible goods among a finite number of individuals is considered. The main result is that in a pure distributional case, a mechanism is strategy-proof, nonbossy and neutral if and only if it is serially dictatorial. If the indivisible goods are initially owned by the individuals, a mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto consistent if and only if it is the core mechanism.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 557-567
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:4:p:557-567

Note: Received: 15 September 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998
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  5. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2004. "Strategy-Proof and Fair Wages," Working Papers 2004:8, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Svensson , Lars-Gunnar, 2002. "Strategy-proofness and Fixed-price Allocation of Indivisible Goods - a Characterization Proof," Working Papers 2002:17, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Smez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," Discussion Papers 0203-18, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar, 2006. "Coalition Strategy-Proofness and Fairness," Working Papers 2006:10, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  11. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2005. "Relationships between Non-Bossiness and Nash Implementability," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-33, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP). [Downloadable!]
  12. Svensson, Lars-Gunnar & Larsson, Bo, 2002. "Strategy-Proofness, Core, and Sequential Trade," Working Papers 2002:14, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 09 May 2003.
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