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Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules

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  • Jacob Coreno
  • Ivan Balbuzanov

Abstract

Drafts are sequential allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues). Agents report ordinal preferences over objects and bundles are partially ordered by pairwise comparison. We provide a simple characterization of draft rules: they are the only allocation rules which are respectful of a priority (RP), envy-free up to one object (EF1), non-wasteful (NW) and resource monotonic (RM). RP and EF1 are crucial for competitive balance in sports leagues. We also prove three related impossibility theorems showing that the competitive-balance axioms RP and EF1 are generally incompatible with strategy-proofness. However, draft rules satisfy maxmin strategy-proofness. If agents may declare some objects unacceptable, then draft rules are characterized by RP, EF1, NW, and RM, in conjunction with individual rationality and truncation invariance. In a model with variable populations, draft rules are characterized by EF1, EFF, and RM, together with (population) consistency, top-object consistency, and neutrality.

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  • Jacob Coreno & Ivan Balbuzanov, 2022. "Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules," Papers 2204.08300, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2204.08300
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