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Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

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Author Info

  • Ünver, M. Utku

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Boston College)

  • Kesten, Onur

    ()
    (Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Kurino, Morimitsu

    ()
    (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin f\"ur Sozialforschung)

  • Hashimoto, Tadashi

    ()
    (Institut d'\'{E}conomie Industrielle, Universit\'{e} Toulouse)

  • Hirata, Daisuke

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Harvard University)

Abstract

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where “sd” stands for first-order stochastic dominance).

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File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20140253/10216/317
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 9 (2014)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1010

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Web page: http://econtheory.org

Related research

Keywords: Random assignment; probabilistic serial; ordinal fairness; sd-efficiency; sd-envy-freeness;

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References

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  1. Chambers, Christopher P., 2004. "Consistency in the probabilistic assignment model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 953-962, December.
  2. Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
  3. Kojima, Fuhito & Manea, Mihai, 2010. "Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 106-123, January.
  4. Sonmez, Tayfun & Utku Unver, M., 2005. "House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 153-185, July.
  5. Pathak, Parag A. & Sethuraman, Jay, 2011. "Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  6. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2011. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 784, Boston College Department of Economics.
  7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
  8. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2008. "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 669-89, June.
  9. Athanassoglou, Stergios & Sethuraman, Jay, 2010. "House allocation with fractional endowments," MPRA Paper 24351, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Katta, Akshay-Kumar & Sethuraman, Jay, 2006. "A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 231-250, November.
  11. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sonmez, 1998. "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 689-702, May.
  12. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2003. "Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 157-172, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Alcalde, Jose & Silva-Reus, José Ángel, 2013. "Allocating via Priorities," QM&ET Working Papers 13-3, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
  2. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "Assigning agents to a line," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 11/2012, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark.

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