Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 55 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Klaus, Bettina & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 1997. "Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-12256, Maastricht University.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomson, W., 1992.
"The Replacement Principle in Public Good Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences,"
RCER Working Papers
340, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Thomson, William, 1993. "The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-36.
- Sprumont, Yves, 1991. "The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 509-19, March.
- Papai, Szilvia, 1996. "Strategyproof Allocation of a Single Object," Working Papers 936, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Thomson William, 1994. "Consistent Solutions to the Problem of Fair Division When Preferences Are Single-Peaked," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 219-245, August.
- Ugur Ozdemir & M. Sanver, 2007. "Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 61-76, January.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001.
"Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
- Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-20043, Maastricht University.
- Miguel Ángel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2006.
"A Characterization of Single-Peaked Preferences,"
273, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Kaminski, Marek M., 2006. "Parametric rationing methods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 115-133, January.
- Shurojit Chatterji & Arunava Sen, 2009.
06-2009, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Bossert W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013.
030, Maastricht : GSBE, Graduate School of Business and Economics.
- Ahmed Doghmi, 2013. "Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 38-49, January.
- Miguel Ballester & Guillaume Haeringer, 2011. "A characterization of the single-peaked domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 305-322, February.
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