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Strategyproof single unit award rules

Author

Listed:
  • Szilvia Pápai

    (Department of Finance and Business Economics, Mendoza College of Business, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA)

Abstract

The problem of allocating a single indivisible unit to one of several agents is considered, where monetary compensations are not allowed, and the unit is not necessarily desirable to each agent. In addition to strategyproofness, three properties of social choice functions are considered: Pareto-optimality, nondictatorship, and nonbossiness. It is shown that these three additional criteria cannot be satisfied simultaneously. However, any two of the additional criteria can be satisfied. We give characterizations of the classes of strategyproof social choice functions satisfying these three pairs of properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Szilvia Pápai, 2001. "Strategyproof single unit award rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(4), pages 785-798.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:18:y:2001:i:4:p:785-798
    Note: Received: 18 February 1998/Accepted: 15 May 2000
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolò, Antonio & Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo, 2017. "Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 508-524.
    2. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation," Working Papers 33, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Saralees Nadarajah, 2009. "The Pareto optimality distribution," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 43(6), pages 993-998, November.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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