Monotonicity and Envyfree Assignments
AbstractGiven any problem involving assignment of indivisible objects and a sum of money among individuals, there is an efficient envy-free allocation (namely the minmax money allocation) which can be extended monotonically to a new efficient envyfree allocation for any object added or individual removed, and another (the maximin value allocation) extendable similarly for any object removed or person added. Still, the efficient envyfree solution is largely incompatible with the resource and population monotonicity axioms: The minmax money and maxmin value allocations are unique in being extendable.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 4 (1994)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bevia, Carmen, 1996. "Population monotonicity in economies with one indivisible good," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 125-137, October.
- Velez, Rodrigo A., 2011. "Are incentives against economic justice?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 326-345, January.
- Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation," Working Papers 33, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Bevia, Carmen, 1996. "Population monotonicity in a general model with indivisible goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 91-97, January.
- Francois Maniquet, 2002.
"Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects,"
Economics Working Papers
0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
- Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Open Access publications from UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain info:hdl:2078.1/28749, Université catholique de Louvain.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.