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Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

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  • Maniquet, François

Abstract

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 143 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 199-215

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:143:y:2008:i:1:p:199-215

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Keywords: Indivisible good Social ordering function Leximin;

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Cited by:
  1. Medernach, Emmanuel & Sanlaville, Eric, 2012. "Fair resource allocation for different scenarios of demands," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 218(2), pages 339-350.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Series Working Papers 2004-W27, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.

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