We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with different, non-transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them. We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on efficiency, fairness and robustness properties. Taking into account incentive constraints we derive the optimal policy : individuals with the same talent need to be equally compensated and only people whose level of talent is below a certain threshold should receive a positive compensation.
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Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 2002.
"Fair Income Tax,"
Economics Working Papers
0021, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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MARC FLEURBAEY & FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, 2006.
"Fair Income Tax,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83, 01.
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