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The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

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  • Marc Fleurbaey

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Abstract

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10058-005-0124-z
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 145-166

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:145-166

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Related research

Keywords: Social welfare; social choice; fairness; egalitarian-equivalence;

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References

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  1. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
  2. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  3. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  4. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
  5. Tungodden, Bertil, 2000. "Egalitarianism: Is Leximin the Only Option?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(02), pages 229-245, October.
  6. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
  7. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2003:i:31:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Fran�ois Maniquet, 2006. "Fair Income Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83.
  3. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Do Irrelevant Commodities Matter?," IDEP Working Papers 0504, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised Jan 2005.
  4. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  5. Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
  6. Marc Fleurbaey, 2012. "Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 599-614, July.
  7. SPRUMONT, Yves, 2007. "Resource Egalitarianism with a Dash of Efficiency," Cahiers de recherche 03-2007, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  8. Giacomo, VALETTA, 2007. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  9. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France.

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