The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense
AbstractIt is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 9 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
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Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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