Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Herve Moulin
• William Thomson

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Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 400.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:400

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, HARKNESS 231 ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

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Keywords: ECONOMETRICS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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