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Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation

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Author Info

  • Moulin, H
  • Thomson, W

Abstract

This essay reports (without attempting an exhaustive survey of the literature) on a body of formal research rooted in the models with which these authors were concerned : the model of bargaining, the model of coalitional opportunities, and the model of distribution of unproduced resources; and dealing axiomatically with a variety of other allocation problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) in its series RCER Working Papers with number 400.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:rocher:400

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.

Related research

Keywords: ECONOMETRICS;

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Cited by:
  1. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
  2. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0206, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Sep 2003.
  3. Somdeb Lahiri, 2005. "Consistency and the Competitive Outcome Function," Game Theory and Information 0512002, EconWPA.
  4. Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers 0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  5. Salvador Barbera, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Discussion Papers 1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "Envy Minimization in the Optimal Tax Context," Working Papers 1178, Queen's University, Department of Economics.

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