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Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments

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Author Info
Francois Maniquet () (Department of Economics, Universite catholique de Louvain)
Yves Sprumont

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Abstract

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the property that individual welfare levels exceeding a legitimate upper bound should be reduced. Combining that property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science in its series Economics Working Papers with number 0016.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: May 2002
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Publication status: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 120(2), February 2005, 155-74
Handle: RePEc:ads:wpaper:0016

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Moulin, Herve, 1992. " All Sorry to Disagree: A General Principle for the Provision of Nonrival Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 94(1), pages 37-51.
  3. Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Social Orderings for the Assignment of Indivisible Objects," Economics Working Papers 0015, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Cahiers de recherche 2002-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fleurbaey,M., 2001. "The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering : a defense," Working Papers 328, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Yves Sprumont, 1998. "Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 543-558. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giacomo Valletta, 2009. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 455-478, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. SPRUMONT, Yves & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach," Cahiers de recherche 2006-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  3. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Papers 2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  4. Giacomo, VALETTA, 2007. "A fair solution to the compensation problem," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007038, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
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