This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
François Maniquet
Yves Sprumont

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00503.x
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 72 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
Pages: 627-640
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:72:y:2004:i:2:p:627-640

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Yves Sprumont, 1998. "Equal factor equivalence in economies with multiple public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 543-558. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  7. Moulin, Herve, 1987. "Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(4), pages 963-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2007. "Equal Sacrifice and Fair Burden Sharing in a Public Goods Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2008. "Equal sacrifice and fair burden-sharing in a public goods economy," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 415-429, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marc Fleurbaey, 2004. "Two Criteria for Social Decisions," Economics Papers 2004-W27, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  4. Marc Fleurbaey & Koichi Tadenuma, 2009. "Universal Social Orderings," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd08-024, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  5. Chambers, Christopher P. & Hayashi, Takashi, . "Money metric utilitarianism," Working Papers 1295, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  6. FLEURBAEY, Marc & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good without Subsidies," Cahiers de recherche 2006-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marc Fleurbaey & Francois Maniquet, 2002. "Fair Income Tax," Economics Working Papers 0021, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Welfare Egalitarianism in Non-Rival Environments," Economics Working Papers 0016, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "Social Welfare, Priority to the Worst-Off And the Dimensions of Individual Well-Being," IDEP Working Papers 0312, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France. [Downloadable!]
  10. SPRUMONT, Yves & MANIQUET, François, 2006. "Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach," Cahiers de recherche 2006-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Cannot find something on IDEAS? Encourage the publisher to index it! Instructions.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.