This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Arrovian Aggregation in Economic Environments: How Much Should We Know About Indifference Surfaces?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Fleurbaey, Marc
Suzumura, Kotaro
Tadenuma, Koichi
Abstract

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and nondictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference hypersurfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes "within the Edgeworth box" is not enough, and knowledge of substantially non-local information is necessary.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/14419/1/pie_dp121.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center for Intergenerational Studies, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Paper with number 121.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 31 p.
Date of creation: Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hit:piedp1:121

Note: November 2002 (First version: July 2001)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://cis.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Koji OHTAGAKI).

Related research
Keywords: social choice; preference aggregation; information; independence of irrelevant alternatives; indifference curves;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc data is maintained by each archive holder on its own website. Nothing is held centrally.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.