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Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments

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Author Info
Georges Bordes
Peter J. Hammond
Michel Le Breton

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Abstract

March 1997

Arrow's ``impossibility'' and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but ``saturating'' domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly) monotone ``economic preferences'' for private and/or public goods. For strongly saturating domains of more general utility profiles, this paper provides similar extensions of Wilson's theorem and of the strong and weak ``welfarism'' results due to d'Aspremont and Gevers and to Roberts. Hence, for social welfare functionals with or without interpersonal comparisons of utility, most previous classification results in social choice theory apply equally to strongly saturating economic domains.

Journal of Economic Literature classification: D71.

Keywords: social welfare functionals, Arrow's theorem, Wilson's theorem, welfarism, neutrality, restricted domains, economic domains, economic environments.

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Paper provided by Stanford University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 97023.

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Date of creation: Mar 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:97023

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Related research
Keywords: social welfare functionals; Arrow's theorem; Wilson's theorem; welfarism; neutrality; restricted domains; economic domains; economic environments;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "Characterization of the Private Alternative Domains Admitting Arrow Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers 341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Border, Kim C., 1983. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 205-216, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wilson, Robert, 1972. "Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 478-486, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Weymark, J.A., 1997. "Welfarism On Economic Domains," UBC Departmental Archives 97-11, UBC Department of Economics.
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  5. Bordes, Georges & Breton, Michel Le, 1989. "Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 257-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction," Working Papers 99021, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ritz, Zvi, 1985. "Restricted domains, arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Roberts, Kevin, 1983. "Social choice rules and real-valued representations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 72-94, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1127-35, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1988. "Social choice in economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 291-308, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gevers, Louis, 1977. "Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 199-209, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Roberts, Kevin W S, 1980. "Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(2), pages 421-39, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," Working Papers 0206, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Sep 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. BLACKORBY, Charles & BOSSERT, Walter & DONALDSON, David, 2002. "In Defense of Welfarism," Cahiers de recherche 2002-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Yukinori Iwata, 2009. "Consequences, opportunities, and Arrovian impossibility theorems with consequentialist domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 513-531, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2004. "The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated," Working Papers hal-00242931_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2004. "Multi-Profile Welfarism : A Generalisation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 710, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Peter J. Hammond, 1999. "Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction," Working Papers 99021, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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