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Social choice theory without the Pareto Principle

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Wilson, Robert

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 5 (1972)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 478-486
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:5:y:1972:i:3:p:478-486

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  1. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2003. "A necessary and sufficient condition for Wilson's impossibility theorem with strict non-imposition," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(17), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  2. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality, but not IIA," Working Papers 38, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  3. M. Fleurbaey, 2000. "Choix social : une difficulté et de multiples possibilités," THEMA Working Papers 2000-23, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  4. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2006. "Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives," Working Papers 43, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kevin Roberts, 2005. "Social Choice Theory and the Informational Basis Approach," Economics Series Working Papers 247, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Estelle Cantillon & Antonio Rangel, 2000. "A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1285, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 1997. "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Working Papers 97023, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Kenryo Indo, 2007. "Proving Arrow’s theorem by PROLOG," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 57-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. John A. Weymark, 2000. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Working Papers 0029, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Feb 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Mongin, Philippe, 2006. "Factoring out the impossibility of logical aggregation," Les Cahiers de Recherche 854, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Herrade Igersheim, 2005. "Extending Xu's results to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(13), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  12. dÕASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers 2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Yasuhito Tanaka, 2005. "A topological approach to the Arrow impossibility theorem when individual preferences are weak orders (forcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Compuation''(Elsevier))," Public Economics 0506013, EconWPA, revised 16 Jun 2005. [Downloadable!]
  14. Kotaro Suzumura, 2001. "Introduction Hondbook of Social Choice and Welfare Edited by Kenneth Arrow, Amartya Sen and Kotaro Suzumura Amsterdam: Elsevier/North-Holland," Discussion Paper Series a417, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  15. Elad Dokow & Ron Holzman, 2009. "Aggregation of binary evaluations for truth-functional agendas," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 221-241, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Daniel Eckert, 2004. "Proximity Preservation in an Anonymous Framework," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(6), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
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