Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

Contents:

Author Info

  • Michel Le Breton

    ()
    (GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1)

  • John A. Weymark

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

Abstract

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu02-w06R.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2003
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0206.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2002
Date of revision: Sep 2003
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0206

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

Related research

Keywords: Social choice; Arrow's Theorem; restricted domains;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. LeBreton, M., 1994. "Arrovian Social Choice on Economic Domains," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III 94a37, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  2. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 311-341, 04.
  3. Lars Ehlers & John A. Weymark, 2001. "Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0113, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  4. Campbell, Donald E, 1992. "Implementation of Social Welfare Functions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(3), pages 525-33, August.
  5. Georges Bordes & Peter J. Hammond & Michel Le Breton, 2005. "Social Welfare Functionals on Restricted Domains and in Economic Environments," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(1), pages 1-25, 02.
  6. Michel Le Breton & John A. Weymark, 2000. "Social Choice with Analytic Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics 0023, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Mar 2001.
  7. Border, Kim C., 1983. "Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 205-216, April.
  8. Kannai, Yakar, 1970. "Continuity Properties of the Core of a Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 38(6), pages 791-815, November.
  9. Grether, David M. & Plott, Charles R., . "Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 271, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Campbell, Donald E., 1992. "Quasitransitive intergenerational choice for economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 229-247.
  11. Kannai, Yakar, 1974. "Approximation of convex preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 101-106, August.
  12. Ehud Kalai & Zvi Ritz, 1978. "Characterization of the Private Alternative Domains Admitting Arrow Social Welfare Functions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 341, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Dutta, Bhaskar & Jackson, Matthew O & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1013-37, July.
  14. Inada, Ken-ichi, 1971. "Social Welfare Function and Social Indifference Surfaces," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 39(3), pages 599-624, May.
  15. Campbell, Donald E., 1993. "Euclidean individual preference and continuous social preference," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 541-550, November.
  16. EHLERS, Lars & STORCKEN, Ton, 2002. "Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2002-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  17. Donaldson, David & Weymark, John A., 1988. "Social choice in economic environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 291-308, December.
  18. Campbell, Donald E., 1992. "The arrow and plott independence conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 143-146, June.
  19. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
  20. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Muller & Mark Satterthwaite, 1979. "Social welfare functions when preferences are convex, strictly monotonic, and continuous," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 87-97, March.
  21. Peters, Hans & Wakker, Peter, 1991. "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1787-1801, November.
  22. Gaertner, Wulf, 2002. "Domain restrictions," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 131-170 Elsevier.
  23. John Bone, 2003. "Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 41-48.
  24. James Redekop, 1996. "Arrow theorems in mixed goods, stochastic, and dynamic economic environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 95-112, January.
  25. Campbell, Donald E, 1992. "Transitive Social Choice in Economic Environments," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 341-52, May.
  26. Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 414-423, April.
  27. Moulin, Herve & Thomson, William, 1988. "Can everyone benefit from growth? : Two difficulties," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 339-345, September.
  28. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  29. Moulin, H & Thomson, W, 1995. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers 400, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  30. Campbell, Donald E., 1990. "Can equity be purchased at the expense of efficiency? An axiomatic inquiry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 32-47, June.
  31. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 1999. "Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 47-85, August.
  32. Redekop, James, 1993. "The questionnaire topology on some spaces of economic preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 479-494.
  33. Weymark, John A., 1998. "Welfarism on economic domains1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 251-268, December.
  34. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1976. "On Linear and Lexicographic Orders, Majority Rule and Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 17(1), pages 213-19, February.
  35. Bordes, Georges & Breton, Michel Le, 1989. "Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 257-281, April.
  36. Jeffrey Richelson, 1984. "Social choice and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 225-234, January.
  37. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  38. Ehlers, Lars, 2001. "Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 239-250, March.
  39. Bordes, Georges & Campbell, Donald E & Le Breton, Michel, 1995. "Arrow's Theorem for Economic Domains and Edgeworth Hyperboxes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 441-54, May.
  40. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2002. "Impossibility theorems in the arrovian framework," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Elsevier, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 35-94 Elsevier.
  41. Le Breton, Michel & Trannoy, Alain, 1987. "Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The arrowian case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 248-269, April.
  42. Saari, Donald G., 1991. "Calculus and extensions of Arrow's theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 271-306.
  43. Bailey, Martin J, 1979. "The Possibility of Rational Social Choice in an Economy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 37-56, February.
  44. Weymark, John A., 1997. "Aggregating Ordinal Probabilities on Finite Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 407-432, August.
  45. Redekop, James, 1991. "Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 396-427, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0206. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.