The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense
AbstractIt is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of a fixed bundle of divisible goods. The paper follows an approach to preference aggregation which relies only on interpersonally non-comparable preferences, and circumvents Arrow's impossibility by taking account of the shape of indifference curves. Social preferences can then be constructed and justified with fairness principles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 328.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2001
Date of revision:
social welfare; social choice; fairness; egalitarian-equivalence;
Other versions of this item:
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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