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Two Criteria for Social Decisions

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  • Marc Fleurbaey

    ()
    (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK)

Abstract

This paper studies the ethical underpinnings of two social criteria which are prominent in the literature dealing with the problem of evaluating allocations of several consumption goods in a population with heteregenous preferences. The Pazner-Schmeidler criterion (Pazner-Schmeidler 1978) and the Walrasian criterion (Fleurbaey and Maniquet 1996) are prima facie quite different. But it is shown here that these criteria are related to close variants of the fairness condition that an allocation is better when every individual bundle in it dominates the average consumption in another allocation. In addition, the results suggest that the Pazner-Schmeidler criterion can be viewed as the best extension of the Walrasian criterion to non-convex economies.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w27/Twocriteria2.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2004-W27.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0427

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Web page: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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Keywords: social welfare; social choice; fairness;

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References

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  1. Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2005. "Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 93-127, 09.
  2. Tadenuma, Koichi, 2002. "Efficiency First or Equity First? Two Principles and Rationality of Social Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 462-472, June.
  3. Marc Fleurbaey & Alain Trannoy, 2003. "The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 243-263, October.
  4. Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 455-473, 06.
  5. Francois Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0014, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  6. Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
  7. Charles Blackorby & David Donaldson, 1990. "A Review Article: The Case against the Use of the Sum of Compensating Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 471-94, August.
  8. Varian, Hal R., 1974. "Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 63-91, September.
  9. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
  10. Marc Fleurbaey & Fran�ois Maniquet, 2006. "Fair Income Tax," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(1), pages 55-83.
  11. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
  12. Maniquet, Francois, 1999. "A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 467-474, December.
  13. Marc Fleurbaey & Philippe Mongin, 2004. "The News of the Death of Welfare Economics is Greatly Exaggerated," Working Papers, HAL hal-00242931, HAL.
  14. Amartya Sen, 1999. "The Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 349-378, June.
  15. Pazner, Elisha A & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-87, November.
  16. MANIQUET, François & SPRUMONT, Yves, . "Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1826, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Samuelson, Paul A, 1977. "Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 44(173), pages 81-88, February.
  18. Marc Fleurbaey & Kotaro Suzumura & Koichi Tadenuma, 2005. "The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 311-341, 04.
  19. Marc Fleurbaey, 2003. "On the informational basis of social choice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 347-384, October.
  20. Thomson, William, 1988. "A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 237-254, December.
  21. Marc Fleurbaey, 2005. "Health, Wealth, and Fairness," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 253-284, 05.
  22. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2000. "Fair Social Orderings With Unequal Production Skills," THEMA Working Papers, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 2000-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yves SPRUMONT, 2009. "Relative Egalitarianism and Related Criteria," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 02-2009, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Sprumont, Yves, 2012. "Resource egalitarianism with a dash of efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(4), pages 1602-1613.

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