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Fair social orderings

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Fleurbaey

    (CERSES - UMR 8137 - Centre de recherche sens, ethique, société - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • François Maniquet

    (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain)

Abstract

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Fleurbaey & François Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Post-Print hal-00246525, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00246525
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sprumont, Yves & Zhou, Lin, 1999. "Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 321-339, April.
    2. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    3. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    4. Hervé Moulin & William Thomson, 1997. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems," International Economic Association Series, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), Social Choice Re-examined, chapter 5, pages 101-120, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. GEVERS, Louis, 1986. "Walrasian social choice: some simple axiomatic approaches," LIDAM Reprints CORE 708, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    7. Marc Fleurbaey & Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark, 2008. "Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism," Post-Print hal-00246415, HAL.
    8. Fleurbaey, Marc & Suzumura, Kotaro & Tadenuma, Koichi, 2005. "Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 22-44, September.
    9. Marcus Fleming, 1952. "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 66(3), pages 366-384.
    10. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
    11. William Thomson, 1983. "The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 319-326, August.
    12. Moulin, H & Thomson, W, 1995. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers 400, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social orderings; fairness;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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