Compensating the dead? Yes we can!
AbstractAn early death is, undoubtedly, a serious disadvantage. However, the compensation of short-lived individuals has remained so far largely unexplored, probably because it appears infeasible. Indeed, short-lived agents can hardly be identified ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. We argue that, despite the above difficulties, a compensation can be carried out by encouraging early consumption in the life cycle. In a model with heterogeneous preferences and longevities, we show how a specific social criterion can be derived from intuitive principles, and we study the corresponding optimal policy under various informational assumptions. We also study the robustness of our solution to alternative types of preferences and savings policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00564934.
Date of creation: Oct 2010
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compensation ; longevity ; mortality ; fairness ; redistribution;
Other versions of this item:
- FLEURBAEY, Marc & LEROUX, Marie - Louise & PONTHIERE, Gregory, 2010. "Compensating the dead? Yes we can!," CORE Discussion Papers 2010066, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Marc Fleurbaey & Marie-Louise Leroux & Grégory Ponthière, 2010. "Compensating the Dead? Yes we can!," IDEP Working Papers 1005, Institut d'economie publique (IDEP), Marseille, France, revised 20 Oct 2010.
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
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- Gaëtan Delprat & Marie-Louise Leroux & Pierre-Carl Michaud, 2013.
"Evidence on Individual Preferences for Longevity Risk,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4196, CESifo Group Munich.
- G. Delprat & M.-L. Leroux & P.-C. Michaud, 2013. "Evidence on Individual Preferences for Longevity Risk," Cahiers de recherche 1304, CIRPEE.
- Delprat, Gaëtan & Leroux, Marie-Louise & Michaud, Pierre-Carl, 2013. "Evidence on Individual Preferences for Longevity Risk," IZA Discussion Papers 7317, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Grégory Ponthière, 2012. "Fair Accumulation under Risky Lifetime," PSE Working Papers halshs-00746913, HAL.
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