Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dolors Berga

    ()
    (Departament d'Economia, Universitat de Girona)

  • Bernardo Moreno

    ()
    (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga)

Abstract

We concentrate on the problem of the provision of one pure public good whenever agents that form the society have either single-plateaued preferences or single-peaked preferences over the set of alternatives. We are interested in comparing the relationships between different nonmanipulability notions under these two domains. On the single-peaked domain, under strategy-proofness, non-bossiness is equivalent to convexity of the range. Thus, minmax rules are the only strategy-proof non-bossy rules. On the single-plateaued domain, only constant rules are non-bossy or Maskin monotonic; but strategy-proofness and weak non-bossiness are equivalent to weak Maskin monotonicity. Moreover, strategy-proofness and plateau-invariance guarantee convexity of the range.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2008-7.pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-7.

as in new window
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-7

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Plaza del Ejido s/n 29071, Málaga
Phone: 952131196
Fax: 952131199
Email:
Web page: http://webdeptos.uma.es/THEconomica/malagawpseries/METC.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Strategy-proof; Single-plateaued preferences; Single-peaked preferences; Maskin monotonicity; Non-bossiness; Plateau-invariance;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 1987. "On constant maskin monotonic social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 382-386, August.
  2. Yves Sprumont, 1995. "Strategyproof Collective Choice in Economic and Political Environments," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 68-107, February.
  3. Zhou, Lin, 1991. "Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 107-19, January.
  4. Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2006. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments," ISER Discussion Paper 0669, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  5. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013. "The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
  6. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
  7. Barbera, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew O, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 51-87, January.
  8. Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
  9. Mutuswami, Suresh, 2005. "Strategyproofness, Non-Bossiness and Group Strategyproofness in a cost sharing model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 83-88, October.
  10. Border, Kim C & Jordan, J S, 1983. "Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 153-70, January.
  11. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  12. Barbera Salvador & Gul Faruk & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 262-289, December.
  13. Stephen Ching, 1998. "Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters"," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 473-490.
  14. Shigehiro Serizawa, 1999. "Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 121-146, January.
  15. David Cantala, 2004. "Choosing the level of a public good when agents have an outside option," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 491-514, 06.
  16. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  17. Berga, Dolors, 1998. "Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 105-120, March.
  18. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2008. "Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-Peaked versus Single-Plateaued Preferences," Working Papers 2008-7, Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center.
  19. Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier.
  20. Takamiya, Koji, 2001. "Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 201-213, March.
  21. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  22. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  23. Bochet, Olivier & Klaus, Bettina, 2007. "A Note on Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin's (1979) Domain Richness Condition," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  24. Takamiya, Koji, 2007. "Domains of social choice functions on which coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity are equivalent," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 348-354, June.
  25. Klaus, Bettina, 2001. "Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 64-82, January.
  26. Mizukami, Hideki & Wakayama, Takuma, 2009. "The relation between non-bossiness and monotonicity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 256-264, September.
  27. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  28. Ritz, Zvi, 1985. "Restricted domains, arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 1-18, February.
  29. Barbera, S. & Peleg, B., 1988. "Strategy-Proof Voting Schemes With Continuous Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 91.88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 275-298, February.
  2. John A. Weymark, 2011. "A Unified Approach to Strategy-Proofness for Single-Peaked Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 1101, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  3. Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2012. "Single-Plateaued Choice," Cahiers de recherche 05-2012, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  4. BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2013. "Single-basined choice," Cahiers de recherche 2013-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  5. Bettina Klaus & Olivier Bochet, 2013. "The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 41-63, January.
  6. Ahmed Doghmi & Abderrahmane Ziad, 2013. "Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201311, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
  7. Katsuhiko Nishizaki, 2013. "An impossibility theorem for secure implementation in discrete public good economies," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 300-308.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mal:wpaper:2008-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Samuel Danthine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.