Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
AbstractWe study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson et al. (1994). Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 60 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Hideki Mizukami & Takuma Wakayama, 2006. "Dominant Strategy Implementation in Economic Environments," ISER Discussion Paper 0669, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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