Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection
AbstractThis paper studies implementation in a principal-agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementaion models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 1999-8.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/
Other versions of this item:
- Arya, Anil & Glover, Jonathan & Rajan, Uday, 2000. "Implementation in Principal-Agent Models of Adverse Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 87-109, July.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Ex Post Implementation,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1502, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Pereira, Samuel C.A., 2009. "Ignorance in a multi-agent setting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 264-266, December.
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