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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

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Author Info
Dirk Bergemann () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)

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Abstract

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16b/d1666.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1666.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1666

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Mechanism design Implementation Robustness Common knowledge Interim equilibrium Dominant strategies

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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This page was last updated on 2008-10-8.

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