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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

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Abstract

A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with it. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16b/d1666.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1666.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Games and Economic Behavior (2011), 71: 261-281
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1666

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Keywords: Mechanism design; Implementation; Robustness; Common knowledge; Interim equilibrium; Dominant strategies;

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References

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  1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  2. BOCHET, Olivier, 2005. "Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 2005072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Ok, Efe A., 2008. "Nash implementation without no-veto power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 51-67, September.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1666R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2010.
  6. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  7. Bergemann, Dirk & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
  8. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
  10. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609RR, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2009.
  11. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Ex Post Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1502, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  12. Gale, David, 1989. "The Theory of Linear Economic Models," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226278841.
  13. John Duggan, 1997. "Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1175-1200, September.
  14. Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2000. "Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1313, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Lipman Barton L., 1994. "A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 114-129, January.
  16. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1989. "Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 668-91, June.
  17. Jackson, Matthew O, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated.Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 757-75, October.
  18. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March.
  19. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine.
  20. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
  21. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  22. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002286, David K. Levine.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Kyungmin Kim & Antonio Penta, 2012. "A Robustly Efficient Auction," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 248, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  4. Ghossoub, Mario, 2010. "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model," MPRA Paper 37630, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Mar 2012.
  5. Tilman Borgers & Doug Smith, 2012. "Robustly Ranking Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(3), pages 325-29, May.
  6. Artemov, Georgy & Kunimoto, Takashi & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 424-447.

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