Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem

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Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem

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Palfrey, Thomas R
Srivastava, Sanjay

Abstract

The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private-value models if agents do not use weakly-dominated strategies in equilibrium. The authors show that, in such settings, any incentive-compatible allocation rule can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism. They derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation that implies that the positive result for private-value models applies with considerably less generality to common-value settings. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 97 (1989)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 668-91
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:3:p:668-91

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Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1519, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001194, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1561R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised May 2007. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, . "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Barry O'Neill, 2006. "Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1560, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Meirowitz, Adam, 2005. "Deliberative Democracy or Market Democracy: Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and Information," Papers 03-28-2005, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Matthew O. Jackson, 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Discussion Papers 966, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthew, Jackson O. & Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1990. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanism," Working Papers 754, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
- Jackson Matthew O. & Palfrey Thomas R. & Srivastava Sanjay, 1994. "Undominated Nash Implementation in Bounded Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 474-501, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 312-331, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Ex Post Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1502, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Ex Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001110, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Ex Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000018, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Bergemann, Dirk & Morris, Stephen, 2008. "Ex post implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 527-566, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Daniel McFadden, 2009. "The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 77-100, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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