Virtual Bayesian Implementation

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Virtual Bayesian Implementation

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John Duggan

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John Duggan

Abstract

Allowing for incomplete information, this paper characterizes the social choice functions that can be approximated by the equilibrium outcomes of a mechanism: incentive compatibility is necessary and almost sufficient for virtual Bayesian implementability. In conjunction with a second condition, Bayesian incentive consistency, incentive compatibility is also sufficient. This new condition is weak--under standard topological and informational assumptions it is satisfied by every social choice function. The type sets of the agents are taken to be arbitrary (possibly infinite) measurable spaces. An example shows that there are virtually (in fact, exactly) Bayesian implementable social choice functions that are not virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 65 (1997)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1175-1200
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:65:y:1997:i:5:p:1175-1200

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Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1519, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000116, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust virtual implementation with incomplete information: Towards a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine," Working Papers 2007-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Georgy Artemov & Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Robust Virtual Implementation with Incomplete Information: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine," Working Papers 2007-6, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Implementation and Preference for Honesty," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-244, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, . "Type Diversity and Virtual Bayesian Implementation Creation-Date: 2000," Working Papers 2000-16, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Adam Meirowitz, 2007. "Communication and bargaining in the spatial model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 251-266, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-376, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-185, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
- Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007. "Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Honesty-Proof Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-178, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Working Papers 2003-19, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano, 2003. "The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Economics Working Papers 0033, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-287, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "On Detail-Free Mechanism Design And Rationality," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 41-54. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Economics Working Papers 0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Implementation Theory," Working Papers 5-01-1, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Maskin, Eric & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2002. "Implementation theory," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 237-288 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Economics Working Papers 0028, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "A Characterization of Virtual Bayesian Implementation," Working Papers 2002-11, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 312-331, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Decisiveness and the Viability of the State," Working Papers 2000-03, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2004. "Non-Consequential Moral Preferences, Detail-Free Implementation, and Representative Systems," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-304, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
James Schummer, 1999. "Almost-dominant Strategy Implementation," Discussion Papers 1278, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Mathevet, Laurent, 2007. "Supermodular Bayesian implementation: Learning and incentive design," Working Papers 1265, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
Hitoshi Matsushima, 2003. "Universal Mechanisms and Moral Preferences in Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-254, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]

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