The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying implementation on richer type spaces, with more higher order uncertainty. We study the "ex post equivalence" question: when is interim implementation on all possible type spaces equivalent to requiring ex post implementation on the space of payoff types? We show that ex post equivalence holds when the social choice correspondence is a function and in simple quasi-linear environments. When ex post equivalence holds, we identify how large the type space must be to obtain the equivalence. We also show that ex post equivalence fails in general, including in quasi-linear environments with budget balance. For quasi-linear environments, we provide an exact characterization of when interim implementation is possible in rich type spaces. In this environment, the planner can fully extract playersÌ belief types, so the incentive constraints reduce to conditions distinguishing types with the same beliefs about othersÌ types but different payoff types.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: 56 pages Date of creation: May 2003 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Econometrica (2005), 73(6): 1771-1813 Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1421
Find related papers by JEL classification: C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other C82 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Macroeconomic Data
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ehud Kalai, 2002.
"Large Robust Games,"
Discussion Papers
1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2006.
"The Limits of ex post Implementation,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 585-610, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
d'Aspremont, Claude & Crémer, Jacques & Gérard-Varet, Louis-André, 2003.
"Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms,"
IDEI Working Papers
196, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
d'ASPREMONT, Claude & CRƒMER, Jacques & GƒRARD-VARET, Louis-AndrŽ, 2002.
"Balanced Bayesian mechanisms,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2002048, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Joanne Roberts & John Duggan, 2008.
"Robust Implementarion,"
Working Papers
2008-07, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 29 Jan 2008.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.) This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.