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Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Satoru Takahashi

Abstract

We consider the efficient allocation of a single good with interdependent values in a quasi-linear environment. We present an approach to modeling interdependent preferences distinguishing between "payoff types" and "belief types" and report a characterization of when the efficient allocation can be partially Bayesian implemented on a finite type space. The characterization can be used to unify a number of sufficient conditions for efficient partial implementation in this classical auction setting. We report how a canonical language for discussing interdependent types - developed in a more general setting by Bergemann, Morris and Takahashi (2011) - applies in this setting and note by example that this canonical language will not allow us to distinguish some types in the payoff type - belief type language.

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000427.

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Date of creation: 13 Apr 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000427

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1772R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2011.
  2. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
  3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
  4. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  5. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
  6. Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2002. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 03-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 13 Apr 2003.
  7. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Locally robust implementation and its limits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2439-2452.
  8. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 191-200, April.
  9. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  10. Yi‐Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2013. "Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 825-847, 03.
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Cited by:
  1. Farinha Luz, Vitor, 2013. "Surplus extraction with rich type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2749-2762.

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