Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Surplus extraction with rich type spaces

Contents:

Author Info

  • Farinha Luz, Vitor
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with ‘rich’ type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper bound on revenue extraction that explicitly builds on the richness of the information structure. We provide a condition under which this upper bound is achieved and describe an optimal mechanism. Under this condition, we also show that the optimal revenue can be achieved through dominant strategy implementation.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053113001348
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

    Volume (Year): 148 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 6 ()
    Pages: 2749-2762

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2749-2762

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

    Related research

    Keywords: Surplus extraction; Information rents; Mechanism design; Private information; Correlated information; Partial implementation;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
    2. Alex Gershkov & Jacob Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2012. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Working Papers tecipa-445, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Robust Mechanism Design," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000593, www.najecon.org.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000427, David K. Levine.
    5. Neeman, Zvika, 2004. "The relevance of private information in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 55-77, July.
    6. Yi‐Chun Chen & Siyang Xiong, 2013. "Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 825-847, 03.
    7. Kim-Sau Chung & J.C. Ely, 2007. "Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 447-476.
    8. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
    9. Alejandro M. Manelli & Daniel R. Vincent, 2010. "Bayesian and Dominant‐Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private‐Values Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(6), pages 1905-1938, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:148:y:2013:i:6:p:2749-2762. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.