Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
  • Satoru Takahashi

Abstract

A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional preferences; and so on. Two types are said to be strategically indistinguishable if they have an equilibrium action in common in any mechanism that they play. We show that two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they have the same preference hierarchy. We examine how this result extends to alternative solution concepts and strategic relations between types.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4786969000000000054.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 786969000000000054.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 20 Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000273, David K. Levine.
  2. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Chambers, Christopher P., 2008. "Proper scoring rules for general decision models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 32-40, May.
  4. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Di Tillio Alfredo & Grillo Edoardo & Penta Antonio, 2011. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-40, March.
  5. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Yi-Chun Chen & Alfredo Di Tillio & Eduardo Faingold & Siyang Xiong, 2012. "The Strategic Impact of Higher-Order Beliefs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000517, David K. Levine.
  7. Alfredo Di Tillio, 2006. "Subjective Expected Utility in Games," Working Papers 311, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  8. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August.
  9. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  10. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  11. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  12. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
  13. Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006. "An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350, December.
  14. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
  15. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "A Response [Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies I: Complete Information]," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1439-42, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2012. "Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1846, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000601, David K. Levine.
  3. Grant, Simon & Meneghel, Idione & Tourky, Rabee, 2013. "Savage Games: A Theory of Strategic Interaction with Purely Subjective Uncertainty," Risk and Sustainable Management Group Working Papers, University of Queensland, School of Economics 151501, University of Queensland, School of Economics.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000187, David K. Levine.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.