Testing Game Theory
AbstractExperimentalists frequently claim that human subjects playing games in the laboratory violate such solution concepts as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection. This claim is premature. What has been rejected are certain joint hypotheses about preferences, knowledge, and behavior. This note strives to clarify some issues in connection with laboratory experiments, from the viewpoint of non-cooperative game theory, and provides a sketch for a research program for experimental testing of game-theoretic solution concepts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 382.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 10 May 2000
Date of revision: 11 Jan 2001
Publication status: Published in Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour: Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality. Essay in Honour of Werner Güth, Huck, S. (eds.), 2004, pages 85-104, Palgrave .
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Game theory; experiments;
Other versions of this item:
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2000-05-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2000-05-22 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2000-05-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2000-07-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2000-05-22 (Industrial Organization)
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