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An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data

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Author Info
Harry J. Paarsch () (University of Iowa)
Han Hong (Stanford University)

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Abstract

This text, intended for both graduate students and professional researchers, is an effective, concise introduction to the structural econometrics of auctions. Tools from recent developments in theoretical econometrics are combined with established numerical methods to provide a practical guide to most of the main concepts in the empirical analysis of field data from auctions. Among other things, the text is remarkable for a large number of mathematical problems and computer exercises for which sample solutions are provided at the end of the book. In the case of the computer exercises, sample code written in Matlab provides a ready-made toolbox that allows readers to implement many existing empirical specifications efficiently. In the first two chapters, the authors introduce several important issues in the analysis of field data from auctions and then go on to develop a simple theoretical model within the independent, private-values paradigm. In the third chapter, under several data-generating schemes, the authors outline empirical methods for analyzing data from single-unit Vickrey and English auctions, while in the fourth chapter, they outline methods for analyzing data from single-unit, Dutch, and first-price sealed-bid auctions. In the fifth chapter, the authors discuss theoretical issues important in the analysis of multi-good auctions, focusing on the analysis of multi-unit auctions, and then provide examples of some recent strategies designed to analyze data from these auctions. Included at the end are a number of appendixes that review the technical tools required in developing the topics treated in the text. A CD-ROM containing sample computer code and data sets accompanies the text.

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Publisher Info
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
This book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262162350 and published in 2006.

Volume: 1
Edition: 1
ISBN: ISBN-10:
Handle: RePEc:mtp:titles:0262162350

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Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Jake Furbush).

Related research
Keywords: auctions; econometrics;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: General - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Horowitz, John K. & Lynch, Lori & Stocking, Andrew, 2007. "Competition-Based Environmental Policy: An Analysis of Farmland Preservation in Maryland," Working Papers 7340, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Shneyerov, Art & Wong, Adam Chi Leung, 2008. "Identification in First-Price and Dutch Auctions when the Number of Potential Bidders is Unobservable," Micro Theory Working Papers artyom_shneyerov-2008-12, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 01 Oct 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Peter Bardsley & Ingrid Burfurd, 2008. "Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1031, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  4. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  5. Christine Zulehner, 2007. "Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions," Vienna Economics Papers 0705, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Yingyao Hu & Matthew Shum, 2007. "Estimating First-Price Auctions with an Unknown Number of Bidders: A Misclassification Approach," Economics Working Paper Archive 541, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Henderson, Daniel J. & List, John A. & Millimet, Daniel L. & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Price, Michael K., 2008. "Imposing Monotonicity Nonparametrically in First-Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 8769, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers 2008-64, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Gino Loyola, 2008. "On bidding markets: the role of competition," Economics Working Papers we083318, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de EconomĂ­a. [Downloadable!]
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