This paper constructs a space of states of the world representing the exhaustive uncertainty facing each player in a strategic situation. The innovation is that preferences are restricted primarily by 'regularity' conditions and need not conform with subjective expected utility theory. The construction employs a hierarchy of preferences, rather than of beliefs as in the standard Bayesian model. Applications include the provision of foundations for a Harsanyi-style game of incomplete information and a rich framework for the axiomatization of solution concepts for complete information normal form games. Copyright 1996 by The Econometric Society.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 64 (1996) Issue (Month): 6 (November) Pages: 1343-73 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)