This paper characterizes solution concepts for games with asymmetric information by means of expressible epistemic assumptions, i.e. events in the universal type space generated by primitive uncertainty about the players' payoff-relevant and payoff-irrelevant information and actions. Interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel et al., Theoretical Econ., 2007) is characterized by rationality and common belief in rationality. Delta-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, Advances Theoretical Econ., 2003) is characterized by (i) rationality, (ii) the restrictions Delta on first-order beliefs, and (iii) common belief in (i) and (ii). Assuming a type space where higher order beliefs are determined by the players' payoff-relevant and payoff-irrelevant information, as is the case in most economic models, interim correlated rationalizability coincides with Delta-rationalizability, provided that Delta is derived by the type space. Moreover, in that special case, rationalizability in the interim strategic form — equivalent to interim independent rationalizability — also coincides with Delta-rationalizability, when Delta requires, in addition, independence between the state of nature and the opponent's action, conditional on the opponent's information. Finally, the paper introduces a new notion of ex ante correlated rationalizability — to be applied to the ex ante strategic form, appropriate to analyze asymmetric information about an initial chance move. It is proved that this ex ante notion is fully equivalent to interim correlated rationalizability.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University in its series Working Papers with number
340.
Length: Date of creation: 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:340
Contact details of provider: Postal: via Rontgen, 1 - 20136 Milano (Italy) Phone: 0039-02-58363301 Fax: 0039-02-58363302 Web page: http://www.igier.unibocconi.it/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Melissa Fiorucci).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Ronald Fagin & Joseph Y. Halpern & Yoram Moses & Moshe Y. Vardi, 2003.
"Reasoning About Knowledge,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262562006.
Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993.
"Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006.
"Topologies on types,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006.
"Topologies on Type,"
Discussion Papers
1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Topologies on Types,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]