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Uniform topologies on types

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  • ,

    (Department of Economics, National University of Singapore)

  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Università Luigi Bocconi)

  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Rice University)

Abstract

We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet 1989). We show that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris 2006). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform-weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games.

Suggested Citation

  • , & , & , & ,, 2010. "Uniform topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(3), September.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:462
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, 1997. "Refinements and Social Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey," Discussion Papers 1197, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. , & , & ,, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
    3. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    4. , & , & ,, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
    5. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June.
    6. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September.
    7. Executive Board, 2008. ""Topologies on types": Correction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    8. Adam Brandenburger & Eddie Dekel, 2014. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 2, pages 31-41, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. MERTENS, Jean-François & ZAMIR, Shmuel, 1985. "Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information," LIDAM Reprints CORE 608, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Pęski, 2011. "Critical Types," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(3), pages 907-937.
    11. Dov Monderer & Dov Samet, 1996. "Proximity of Information in Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(3), pages 707-725, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rationalizability; incomplete information; higher-order beliefs; strategic topology; electronic mail game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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