Uniform Topologies on Types
AbstractWe study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet (1989)). We show that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform-weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1734.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Other versions of this item:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2009-11-14 (Game Theory)
- NEP-SEA-2009-11-14 (South East Asia)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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