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Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

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Dirk Bergemann
Stephen Morris

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001569.

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Date of creation: 24 Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001569

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Discussion Papers 1244, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1609, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Ehud Kalai, 2004. "Large Robust Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(6), pages 1631-1665, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Forges, F., 1993. "Five Ligitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Game with Incomplete Information," Papers 9309, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
  12. Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
  13. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1248, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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  14. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Battigalli, P., 1999. "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers eco99/17, European University Institute.
  16. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1628, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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