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Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris

Abstract

We consider the following belief free solution concepts for games with incomplete information: (i) incomplete information rationalizability, (ii) incomplete information correlated equilibrium and (iii) ex post equilibrium. We present epistemic foundations for these solution concepts and establish relationships between them. The properties of these solution concepts are further developed in supermodular games and potential games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 122247000000001569.

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Date of creation: 24 Sep 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001569

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References

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  1. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  2. Morris, Stephen Morris & Takashi Ui, 2002. "Best Response Equivalence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1377, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Ehud Kalai, 2002. "Large Robust Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1350, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Abraham Neyman, 1997. "Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 223-227.
  8. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2007. "Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000149, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
  10. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1998. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 98-22, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  11. Cotter, Kevin D., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 48-68, June.
  12. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  13. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  15. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  16. Heumen, R. van & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S.H. & Borm, P.E.M., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of solutions for Bayesian games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-72930, Tilburg University.
  17. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1248, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  18. Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987. "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1391-1402, November.
  19. FORGES, Françoise, . "Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete informations," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. Börgers Tilman M & McQuade Timothy, 2007. "Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-31, December.
  21. Battigalli, P., 1999. "Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute eco99/17, European University Institute.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1822, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Alfredo Di Tillio & Edoardo Grillo & Antonio Penta, 2008. "Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 340, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  3. Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 551-559, 04-05.
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
  6. Igal Milchtaich, 2014. "Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 283-350, May.
  7. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 921, HEC Paris.
  8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2007. "Interactive epistemology in games with payoff uncertainty," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 165-184, December.

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