• NEP-ALL-1998-11-20 (All new papers)
• NEP-EVO-1998-11-20 (Evolutionary Economics)

1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Aviad Heifetz & Dov Samet, 1996. "Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs," Game Theory and Information 9609002, EconWPA, revised 17 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
3. Philip J. Reny, 1995. "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Battigalli, P. & Bonanno, G., 1993. "Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games," Papers 93-11, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
9. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Joseph Greenberg & Sudheer Gupta & Xiao Luo, 2009. "Mutually acceptable courses of action," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 91-112, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Perea,Andrés, 2004. "Minimal Belief Revision leads to Backward Induction," Research Memoranda 032, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
3. Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, 2005. "Hierarchies of Belief and Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000817, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey C. Ely & Marcin Peski, . "Hierarchies Of Belief And Interim Rationalizability," Discussion Papers 1388, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March. [Downloadable!]
4. Oliver Board, 2002. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Working Papers 244, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2002. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Board, 2003. "Algorithmic Characterization of Rationalizability in Extensive Form Games," Economics Series Working Papers 148, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Amanda Friedenberg, 2006. "Can Hidden Variables Explain Correlation? (joint with Adam Brandenburger)," Theory workshop papers 815595000000000005, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, . "An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability," Working Papers 1999.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
7. Vittorio Pelligra, 2007. "Intentions, Trust and Frames: A note on Sociality and the Theory of Games," Working Paper CRENoS 200702, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia. [Downloadable!]
8. repec:bep:theadv:v:3:y:2003:i:1:p:1073-1073 is not listed on IDEAS
9. Oliver Board, 2002. "Dynamic Interactive Epistemology," Economics Series Working Papers 125, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Board, Oliver, 2004. "Dynamic interactive epistemology," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 49-80, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 2002. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," Princeton Economic Theory Working Papers 9817a118e65062903de7c3577, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
11. Andrés Perea, 2006. "Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 529-559, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2004. "Rationalization in Signaling Games: Theory and Applications," Working Papers 275, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Proper Rationalizability and Belief Revision in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 048, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
16. Penta, Antonio, 2004. "Perfect Sequential Reciprocity and Dynamic Consistency," MPRA Paper 10261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2007. [Downloadable!]
17. Adam Brandenburger, 2007. "The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 465-492, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Muhamet Yildiz & Jonathan Weinsten, 2004. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 157, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Weinstein, Jonathan & Yildiz, Muhamet, 2007. "Impact of higher-order uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 200-212, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Iterated Admissibility as Solution Concept in Game Theory," Working Papers 47, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002. [Downloadable!]
20. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March. [Downloadable!]
21. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]