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Amissibility and Common Belief

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  • Asheim, Geir B.

    ()
    (Department of Economics ,University of Oslo)

  • Dufwenberg, Martin

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University)

Abstract

The concept of ‘fully permissible sets ’ is defined by an algorithm that eliminate strategy subset . It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominate the latter on the sets of all opponent strategie or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. the concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2000:6.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 29 Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2000_0006

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Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
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Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
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Keywords: Admissibility; Denkel-Fudenberg; common belief;

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References

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  1. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
  3. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society.
  4. Rajan, Uday, 1998. "Trembles in the Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 248-266, September.
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  6. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 5-89-6, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
  7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April.
  8. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 2002. "Strong Belief and Forward Induction Reasoning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 356-391, October.
  9. Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November.
  10. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November.
  11. Geir B. Asheim & Martin Dufwenberg, 2003. "Deductive Reasoning in Extensive Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(487), pages 305-325, 04.
  12. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f3, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  13. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
  14. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
  15. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  16. Hurkens, S., 1993. "Multi-Sided Pre-Play Communication By Burning Money," Papers 9319, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  17. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154422, Tilburg University.
  18. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
  19. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February.
  20. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  21. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  22. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46, January.
  23. Geir B. Asheim, 2002. "Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 453-478.
  24. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
  25. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
  26. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October.
  27. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January.
  28. Borgers, Tilman & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. ""Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 13-25.
  29. Christian Ewerhart, 1998. "Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 49-59.
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