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On the epistemic foundation for backward induction

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Author Info
Asheim,G.B. (University of Oslo, Department of Economics)

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File URL: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/memo/memopdf/memo3099.pdf
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Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 30/1999.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1999_030

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
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Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
    Other versions:
  2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Giacomo Bonanno, . "Branching Time Logic, Perfect Information Games And Backward Induction," Department of Economics 98-13, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995. "A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Other versions:
  9. Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Borgers Tilman, 1994. "Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 265-276, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "Proper consistency," Memorandum 31/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
  18. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Epstein, Larry G & Wang, Tan, 1996. ""Beliefs about Beliefs" without Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1343-73, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov, 1989. "Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 170-190, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993. "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 189-198, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Perea,Andrés, 2004. "Minimal Belief Revision leads to Backward Induction," Research Memoranda 032, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  2. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Deductive reasoning in extensive games," Memorandum 08/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bernt P. Stigum, 2000. "Rationality in Econometrics," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0747, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Geir B. Asheim, 2000. "Proper Consistency," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0193, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Asheim, Geir & Søvik, Ylva, 2003. "The semantics of preference-based belief operators," Memorandum 05/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2000. "Is There a Hold-up Problem?," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 357, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Perea, Andrés, 2006. "Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning," Research Memoranda 035, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
  9. Eileen Chou & Margaret McConnell & Rosemarie Nagel & Charles Plott, 2009. "The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 159-179, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Asheim,G.B., 2000. "Deriving belief operators from preferences," Memorandum 25/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Perea,Andrés, 2003. "Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games," Research Memoranda 047, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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