Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory
AbstractWe provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.
Volume (Year): 53 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941
Other versions of this item:
- Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2003. "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Working Papers 9814, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Pierpaolo Battigali & Giacomo Bonanno, . "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Department of Economics 98-14, California Davis - Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Independence and Perfect Bayesian Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 201-234, July.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1997.
"The Logic of Belief Persistence,"
Economics and Philosophy,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(01), pages 39-59, April.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli & Marciano Siniscalchi, 1999.
"An Epistemic Characterisation of Extensive Form Rationalisability,"
1999.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995. "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(5), pages 1161-80, September.
- Lismont L. & Mongin, P., 1996.
"Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 60-60, February.
- Lismont, Luc & Mongin, Philippe, 1995. "Belief closure: A semantics of common knowledge for modal propositional logic," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 127-153, October.
- LISMONT, Luc & MONGIN, Philippe, 1993. "Belief Closure : A Semantics of Common Knowledge for Modal Propositional Logic," CORE Discussion Papers 1993039, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 247-273, September.
- D. B. Bernheim, 2010.
"Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
514, David K. Levine.
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, .
"Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games,"
111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995.
"A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction,"
Discussion Paper Serie B
331, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1997. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect-Information Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 23-46, January.
- Battigalli, P. & Bonanno, G., 1993. "Synchronic Information and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games," Papers 93-11, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.