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Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games

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  • Philip J. Reny

Abstract

It is argued that subgame perfect equilibrium behavior is not an inevitable consequence of common belief of rationality among players in noncooperative extensive-form games. The argument centers around a particular extensive-form game with perfect information. In the context of this game, it is argued that if rationality is not common belief throughout play of the game, then it can be perfectly rational to play contrary to subgame perfection, even if rationality is common belief at the beginning of the game. It is then shown that it is impossible for rationality to be common belief throughout every play of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip J. Reny, 1995. "Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:28:y:1995:i:1:p:1-16
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    Cited by:

    1. John Carroll, 2000. "The Backward Induction Argument," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 61-84, February.
    2. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.

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